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A group of former and current football and men’s 
basketball players, led by ex-UCLA basketball star Edward 
O’Bannon, brought an antitrust suit against the NCAA in 
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
California. Their goal was to obtain an injunction ending 
the NCAA’s rules preventing players from being paid for 
the use of their names, images, or likenesses. Relying in 
large part on a 1984 Supreme Court case, NCAA v. Board 
of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, the NCAA 
claimed that there are specific procompetitive justifications 
for the restrictions, namely, amateurism and competitive 
balance. The district court found that the alleged 
procompetitive justifications did not excuse the challenged 
restraints, a decision that the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit recently upheld. Such rulings are 
contradictory to the fundamental principles of antitrust law 
and have the potential to eliminate the college sports 
product entirely. 
  
                                                                                                             
* Joseph Davison, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2016. 
Thank you to Douglas Ross, adjunct professor at the University of Washington 
School of Law and partner at Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, for his invaluable 
advice and critique throughout the drafting of this Article. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Pay-for-play has long been an expression common to amateur 
sports. Typically, this phrase has described the athlete’s burden, 
whether it be a high school student paying a try-out fee or a “walk-
on” college student-athlete paying tuition. But, as the industry of 
college sports has grown, so too has the cry for compensating 
student-athletes for their role in the economic success. As such, the 
pay-for-play responsibility appears to be shifting to colleges and 
universities. This shift has resulted in an outbreak of antitrust 
action against the National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(“NCAA” or the “Association”), headlined by the recent 
O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Association case, which 
challenged the restrictions on paying student-athletes for the use of 
their names, images, and likenesses. More recently, Jenkins v. 
National Collegiate Athletics Association was filed, challenging all 
restrictions on paying student-athletes. This Article will consider 
the NCAA’s arguments in O’Bannon and will identify the district 
court and the Ninth Circuit’s errors in analyzing those arguments. 
To illustrate the errors of the courts’ analysis, this Article will 
conclude with an evaluation of O’Bannon’s potential impact on the 
upcoming Jenkins suit. 
 
I. BASICS OF ANTITRUST LAW 
 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that no person may 
undertake a “contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint 
of trade.”1 Corporations, in fact, frequently cooperate with one 
another, and most of their cooperation is legal. Understanding 
when such cooperation is illegal requires a specific analysis, 
starting with the language of Section 1. While the statutory 
language initially appeared to the federal courts to bar every 
contract that restrained trade, the Supreme Court ultimately held it 
to prohibit only those restraints of trade that are unreasonable.2 In 
                                                                                                             
1 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 2015). 
2 Bd. of Trade of City of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 239, 241 
(1918). See also Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (“Congress 
intended to outlaw only unreasonable restraints[.]”). 
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implementing a broad standard of “reasonableness,” the Court 
developed a distinction between two kinds of Section 1 cases: (1) 
conduct that is “per se illegal” and (2) conduct that is subject to the 
“rule of reason.”3 
There are certain agreements that, because of their injurious 
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue, are 
presumed to be per se unreasonable and illegal without inquiry into 
specific harm or the business rationale for their use.4 Under current 
law, these consist of so-called “naked” agreements among 
competitors to eliminate competition.5 These include: (1) 
horizontal price-fixing, (2) horizontal market or customer 
allocation, and (3) horizontal concerted refusal to deal (boycotts).6 
If the agreement is not per se illegal, it is traditionally subject to 
rule of reason analysis.7 Such analysis takes into account a variety 
of factors in considering whether the questioned practice imposes 
an unreasonable restraint on competition.8 In recent years, the 
Supreme Court and the Federal Trade Commission have suggested 
that, in some cases, the distinction may not always be “either/or” 
between the rule of reason and the per se rule, but may involve a 
more nuanced analysis into a restraint’s competitive effects known 
as a “quick-look” inquiry.9 
Antitrust law also distinguishes between different kinds of 
conduct, depending on the position of the firms involved in the 
chain of distribution. Two parties are horizontal competitors if they 
compete on the same level of the market, for example, distribution, 
manufacturing, or sales.10 Vertical arrangements occur if one of the 
parties is an “upstream” participant in the market, potentially 
relying on the other to distribute the goods.11 Section 1 of the 
                                                                                                             
3 Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977). 
4 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
5 Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enter., 776 F.2d 185, 188 (7th Cir. 1985). 
6 N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5. 
7 See generally Cont’l T.V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 58. 
8 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997). 
9 See, e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of 
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 89 (1984). 
10 1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 
83 (7th ed. 2012). 
11 Id. at 137. 
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Sherman Act applies to both horizontal and vertical agreements, 
but treats horizontal agreements much more harshly.12 The reason 
for the distinction is simple: Head-to-head competitors ordinarily 
have little reason to legitimately cooperate or agree with one 
another. By contrast, vertical arrangements are essential for 
providing products to consumers.13 
To state a claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, a plaintiff 
must allege “(1) that there was a contract, combination, or 
conspiracy; (2) that the agreement unreasonably restrained trade 
under either a per se rule of illegality or a rule of reason analysis; 
and (3) that the restraint affected interstate commerce.”14 Once 
anticompetitive effects are ascertained, the burden shifts to the 
defendant to produce evidence of procompetitive justifications or 
effects.15 Procompetitive effects include “efficiency gains, the 
development or improvement of products, and other benefits to 
consumers and society.”16 If a procompetitive effect is established, 
the plaintiff must show a less restrictive alternative to the 
challenged restraints that outweighs the procompetitive 
justification.17 
 
II. NCAA V. BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA 
 
NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma is 
frequently recognized as the governing law for challenges to 
restraints regarding amateurism in collegiate sports.18 In Board of 
                                                                                                             
12 Id. at 136. 
13 Id. 
14 Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation 
omitted). 
15 Id. at 1063. 
16 California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1160 (9th Cir. 
2011). 
17 See Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1103 (1st Cir. 1994) 
(Any claimed benefit of the restraint “cannot outweigh its harm to competition, 
if a reasonable, less restrictive alternative to the policy exists that would provide 
the same benefits as the current restraint.”). 
18 See Brief for the National Collegiate Athletic Association at 25, 
O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(No. 14–16601), ECF No. 13. 
5
Davison: Throwing the Flag on Pay-for-Play: The <i>O'Bannon</i> Ruling and
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2015
160 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 11:3 
Regents, two universities challenged an NCAA limitation on the 
number of football games schools could license for telecast.19 The 
Court made clear that NCAA rules designed for preserving 
amateurism, including the rules prohibiting the compensation of 
student-athletes, are valid as a matter of law under the Sherman 
Act. The Court explained that collegiate athletics form “an industry 
in which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the 
product is to be available at all.”20 Though these rules will likely 
“restrain the manner in which institutions compete,” such a league 
would be impossible “if there were no rules on which the 
competitors agreed to create and define the competition to be 
marketed.”21 The Court recognized that NCAA sports have an 
identifiable academic tradition that differentiates them from 
professional sports to which they might otherwise be compared.22 
In order to “preserve the character and quality of the ‘product,’” 
the NCAA must adopt certain rules, such as “athletes must not be 
paid, must be required to attend class, and the like.”23 Board of 
Regents has since been reinforced by American Needle v. National 
Football League, which recognized that rules which define the 
essential character and quality of a product are procompetitive as a 
matter of law.24 
 
III. O’BANNON BACKGROUND 
 
The plaintiffs in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic 
Association, a group of twenty current and former college student-
athletes, brought an antitrust class action suit against the NCAA in 
2009.25 Plaintiffs played either Division I men’s basketball or 
football between 1956 and the present.26 They represent a certified 
                                                                                                             
19 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 
U.S. 85, 89 (1984). 
20 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100–01. 
21 Id. at 101. 
22 Id. at 101–02. 
23 Id. at 102. 
24 Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 203 (2010). 
25 O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 965 
(N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015). 
26 Id. at 965. 
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class of all current and former student-athletes who “compete on, 
or competed on, an NCAA Division I . . . men’s basketball [or] . . . 
football team and whose images, likenesses and/or names may be, 
or have been, included . . . in game footage or in videogames 
licensed or sold by Defendants, their co-conspirators, or their 
licensees.”27 Named plaintiff, Edward O’Bannon, was a student-
athlete at the University of California, Los Angeles (“UCLA”) 
from 1991 to 1995.28 He played on UCLA’s Division I men’s 
basketball team pursuant to the rules and regulations of the 
NCAA.29 
The NCAA is a membership-driven organization dedicated to 
protecting the well-being of student-athletes and equipping them 
with the skills to succeed both academically and athletically.30 
Founded in 1905, the Association includes roughly 350 Division I 
colleges and universities who, together, field more than 6000 
athletic teams and 17,000 student-athletes.31 Today, the 
Association issues and enforces rules focused on promoting a 
balanced academic, social, and athletic experience for student-
athletes.32 To that end, member colleges and universities have 
agreed on several basic principles for Division I athletics.33 These 
include: (1) Student-athletes shall be amateurs in intercollegiate 
sports, and their participation should be motivated primarily by 
education and by the physical, mental, and social benefits to be 
derived, and (2) Student-athletes must be students whose athletic 
activities are conducted as an integral part of their educational 
experiences.34 In accordance with these principles, the NCAA has 
allowed its member schools to provide student-athletes with 
                                                                                                             
27 Id. 
28 Order on NCAA’s and CLC’s Motion to Dismiss at 2, O’Bannon, 7 F. 
Supp. 3d 955 (No. C 09–3329 CW), ECF No. 142. 
29 Id. 
30 About the NCAA, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about (last visited Sept. 
23, 2015). 
31 Id. 
32 NCAA Core Values, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/ncaa-core-values 
(last visited Sept. 23, 2015). 
33 Defendant NCAA’s Trial Brief at 1, O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (No. C 09–3329 CW), ECF No. 184. 
34 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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scholarships for full “grant in aid,” defined as the total cost of 
tuition, fees, room and board, and required books.35 
 
A.  O’Bannon Allegations 
 
The O’Bannon Complaint alleged that the NCAA’s rules 
restricting compensation for the use of the names, images, and 
likenesses of men’s football and basketball players are illegal 
restraints of trade in violation of the Sherman Act.36 Specifically, 
plaintiffs “challenge[d] the set of rules that bar student-athletes 
from receiving a share of the revenue that the NCAA and its 
member schools earn from the sale of licenses to use the student-
athletes’ names, images, and likenesses in videogames, live game 
telecasts, and other footage.”37 O’Bannon claimed that such 
regulations allow the NCAA to enter into licensing agreements to 
distribute student-athlete images which the student-athletes did not 
consent to, nor receive compensation for.38 These actions allegedly 
exclude student-athletes from the collegiate licensing market and 
fix the price of student-athlete images at “zero.”39 O’Bannon 
claimed that this conduct constitutes illegal price-fixing and a 
group boycott, violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act.40 As such, 
O’Bannon requested, among other things, that the court enjoin the 
NCAA from enforcing any releases that purport to have caused any 
member of the class to relinquish rights to compensation for use of 
their names, images, and likenesses; and prevent any such 
agreements between the NCAA and its student-athletes in the 
future.41 
                                                                                                             
35 O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1054 
(2015). 
36 Specifically, NCAA Bylaw Article 12.5.1.1 and Form 08-3a. See Order 
on NCAA’s and CLC’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 28, at 2–3; O’Bannon, 7 
F. Supp. 3d at 963. 




41 Class Action Complaint at 68–69, O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (No. C 
09–3329 CW), ECF No. 1. 
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A two-week trial was held in June of 2014.42 The court found 
that the challenged rules unreasonably restrained trade and could 
not be justified by the NCAA’s procompetitive arguments.43 The 
Ninth Circuit has since upheld much of the district court’s holding 
and its rationale.44 
 
B.  The NCAA’s Procompetitive Justifications and the Courts’ 
Findings 
 
Defendant NCAA argued that the challenged restraints create a 
unique product and promote consumer demand for college 
athletics.45 As a result, the restraints expand consumer choice and 
encourage interbrand competition, the primary concerns of 
antitrust law.46 The NCAA claimed its product is defined by the 
amateur status of the student-athletes and its competitive balance.47 
As such, both of these elements were presented as procompetitive 




The NCAA claimed that the public watches college sports 
because they believe that the student-athletes are playing “for the 
love of the game and for the value and opportunities available to 
them from a college education.”49 To show that amateurism is an 
essential aspect of its product, the NCAA pointed to its long 
history of rules enforcing this tradition.50 Additionally, the NCAA 
presented a number of consumer opinion surveys and testimony 
                                                                                                             
42 O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 963. 
43 Id. 
44 See generally O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 
1049 (9th Cir. 2015). 
45 O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 973. 
46 Defendant NCAA’s Post-Trial Brief at 19, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (No. C 09–
3329 CW), ECF No. 279. 
47 O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 973. 
48 Id. 
49 Defendant NCAA’s Post-Trial Brief, supra note 46, at 19. 
50 Id. 
9
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from various witnesses to support its argument.51 These surveys, 
which asked fans of Division I football and basketball how they 
would react to paying student-athletes, suggested that fans were 
generally opposed to a pay-for-play system.52 Finally, the NCAA 
cited the Supreme Court decision in the Board of Regents case to 
support its amateurism justification.53 
Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that 
the challenged restraints do promote amateurism and have some 
procompetitive value, but found that this did not justify the 
challenged restraints.54 Initially, the district court reasoned that the 
historical evidence regarding the tradition of amateurism 
demonstrated an inconsistent approach to enforcement.55 The court 
noted that in 1916, the NCAA adopted a rule stating that an 
amateur was “one who participates in competitive physical sports 
only for pleasure and the physical, mental, moral, and social 
benefits directly derived therefrom.”56 Currently, the NCAA’s 
amateurism provision states that student-athletes “shall be 
amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their participation should 
be motivated primarily by education and by the physical, mental 
and social benefits to be derived.”57 The court pointed out that 
these definitions are in stark contrast to each other, as evidenced by 
the focus on education in the current rule, which was not 
specifically mentioned in the 1916 definition.58 Rather than 
exhibiting the NCAA’s “adherence to a set of core principles, this 
history documents how malleable the NCAA’s definition of 
amateurism has been.”59 The court thus found the historical 
evidence presented by the NCAA to be unpersuasive.60 The Ninth 
Circuit took a slightly different approach than the district court, 
                                                                                                             
51 O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 999. 
52 Id. at 975. 
53 Id. at 999. 
54 O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1072–73, 
1079 (9th Cir. 2015); O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1001. 
55 O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 973. 
56 Id. at 974. 
57 Id. at 974–75. 
58 Id. at 975. 
59 Id. at 1000. 
60 Id. 
10
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finding that “[e]ven if the NCAA’s concept of amateurism had 
been perfectly coherent and consistent” throughout its history, it 
still did not justify the challenged restraints.61 
Turning to the consumer opinion surveys, the district court 
found these to contain several methodological flaws.62  
Specifically, the surveys did not ask the consumers about the 
particular restraints challenged in this case.63 Furthermore, the 
plaintiff presented several studies to counter the NCAA surveys.64 
After considering this evidence, the court found that the 
amateurism rules play only “a limited role in driving consumer 
demand for [Division I] football and . . . basketball-related 
products.”65 The Ninth Circuit did not address the consumer 
surveys. 
Finally, the NCAA argued that the Supreme Court made clear 
in Board of Regents that the NCAA’s restraints designed for 
preserving amateurism, including the rules prohibiting the 
compensation of student-athletes, are valid as a matter of law 
under the Sherman Act.66 In addressing this argument, both the 
district court and the Ninth Circuit dismissed the relevant portions 
of the case as dicta, noting that “Board of Regents addressed limits 
on television broadcasting, not payments to student-athletes.”67 
Furthermore, the district court stated the industry of college sports 





                                                                                                             
61 O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1073 (9th 
Cir. 2015). 
62 O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1000. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 1001. 
66 Brief for the National Collegiate Athletic Association, supra note 18, at 
22. 
67 O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 999; O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic 
Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1063 (9th Cir. 2015). 
68 O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1000. 
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2. Competitive Balance 
 
The NCAA also claimed that the challenged restraints protect 
the competitive balance in college athletics.69 The NCAA believes 
such competitive balance is essential to sustaining consumer 
demand for the product.70 The Association claimed that the 
“Supreme Court has expressly noted that the NCAA’s restrictions  
. . . are tailored to the goal of competitive balance and are clearly 
sufficient to preserve competitive balance.”71 The NCAA also 
noted that the expert witnesses on both sides testified that if 
student-athletes were able to receive compensation from colleges 
for their names, images, and likenesses, recruits would be more 
likely to attend schools that would offer the greatest amount of 
money.72 The NCAA argued that this would shift the distribution 
of talent towards wealthier colleges, likely resulting in their greater 
success.73 This shift in competitive balance would negatively affect 
the demand for college sports.74 
The district court found the NCAA’s argument unpersuasive.75 
The court cited several sports economists who all concluded that 
“the rules have no discernible effect on the level of competitive 
balance.”76 This appeared to the court to be a logical conclusion 
given the money currently spent on other elements of recruiting.77 
For example, the schools the NCAA pointed to as the wealthy—
who would seemingly be able to recruit the most talented players 
should the restraints be lifted—simply spend that money on 
                                                                                                             
69 Id. at 978. 
70 Id. 
71 Defendant NCAA’s Post-Trial Brief, supra note 46, at 26 (internal 




75 O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 978. The NCAA focused the majority of its 
appellate argument on its amateurism justification. As such, the Ninth Circuit 
“accept[ed] the district court’s factual findings that the compensation rules do 
not promote competitive balance” without consideration of the NCAA’s original 
arguments or those made in its post-trial brief. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1072 (9th Cir. 2015). 
76 O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 978. 
77 Id. 
12
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training facilities and coaching.78 The court reasoned that the “fact 
that high-revenue schools are able to spend freely in these other 
areas cancels out whatever leveling effect the restrictions on 
student-athlete pay might otherwise have.”79 Most importantly, the 
court found that even if the NCAA had sufficiently connected the 
current rules and competitive balance, it had not shown that a 
change in competitive balance would negatively affect consumer 
demand.80 
 
C.  O’Bannon Ruling 
 
Though the district court found that neither of these 
justifications was sufficient to justify the challenged restraints, it 
did hold that the amateurism argument plays a limited role in 
driving consumer demand and thus has a minimal procompetitive 
effect.81 Under the rule of reason, the next step would be a showing 
by the plaintiff of a less restrictive alternative to the challenged 
restraints that outweighs the procompetitive justification.82 
O’Bannon presented such an alternative, which was adopted by the 
district court.83 The court ruled that the member-schools must raise 
the restrictive cap on payments to student athletes to the full cost of 
attendance.84 Full cost of attendance is defined as the full “grant in 
aid” plus non-required books, supplies, transportation, and other 
living expenses.85 The court also found that colleges may allow for 
the creation of a trust for each student-athlete that can hold up to 
$5,000 per year of attendance, payable when the student-athlete 
                                                                                                             
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 978–79. 
80 Id. at 979. 
81 Id. at 1001. 
82 Brief for Antitrust Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant at 6, 
O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(No. 14–16601), ECF No. 17. See also Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34 
F.3d 1091, 1103 (1st Cir. 1994) (Any claimed benefit of the restraint “cannot 
outweigh its harm to competition, if a reasonable, less restrictive alternative to 
the policy exists that would provide the same benefits as the current restraint.”). 
83 O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 983. 
84 Id. at 1008. 
85 O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1054 n.3. 
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leaves school or is no longer eligible to play.86 The court noted that 
the $5,000 cap on additional compensation is “comparable to the 
amount of money that the NCAA permits student-athletes to 
receive if they qualify for a Pell grant.”87 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, finding that “the NCAA’s 
rules have been more restrictive than necessary to maintain its 
tradition of amateurism in support of the college sports market.”88 
It continued by mandating “that the NCAA permit its schools to 
provide up to the [full] cost of attendance to their student 
athletes.”89 But, the court vacated the district court’s judgment 
requiring the NCAA to allow its member schools to pay student-
athletes up to $5000 per year in additional compensation, stating 
that the “difference between offering student-athletes education-





This section will identify the courts’ errors in analyzing the 
NCAA’s amateurism and competitive balance arguments against 
compensating student-athletes for the use of their names, images, 
and likenesses. To best illustrate the magnitude of such errors, this 
section will then identify the disastrous results the ruling would 
trigger if the courts’ rationale were followed in the upcoming 
Jenkins suit. 
 
A.  The Challenged Restraints Are Necessary To Maintain 
Amateurism and Must Be Upheld 
 
In review, the district court held that the amateurism argument, 
though procompetitive, was insufficient to justify the challenged 
                                                                                                             
86 Id. 
87 O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1008. 
88 O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1079. Again, because the NCAA focused its 
appellate argument on its amateurism justification, the Ninth Circuit did not 
analyze the NCAA’s earlier competitive balance arguments. Id. at 1072. 
89 O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1079. 
90 Id. at 1078–79. 
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restraints for three reasons: (1) the historical definitions of 
amateurism are inconsistent, (2) the amateurism rules play only “a 
limited role in driving consumer demand for [Division 1] football 
and . . . basketball-related products,” and (3) the Board of Regents 
case did not have precedential value. The Ninth Circuit came to the 
same finding, albeit through a different analysis of the historical 
definitions of amateurism and the Board of Regents case.  
 
1. The O’Bannon Amateurism Ruling is a Frivolous “Tweak” of a 
Reasonable Restraint 
 
The district court’s finding that the historical definitions of 
amateurism are too inconsistent to justify the restraints can be 
challenged on several fronts. First, while the NCAA’s definition 
has changed many times since 1905, the NCAA has consistently 
observed its central amateurism principle: Student-athletes should 
not be paid for their performance.91 Second, it is highly unrealistic 
to expect an association with hundreds of members and thousands 
of students to maintain a perfectly static definition of amateurism 
for over 100 years. To suggest that the changes in phrasing reflects 
a lack of commitment to the NCAA’s central principle is 
inconsiderate of the inevitable transformation and progression that 
an organization goes through over a long period of time, while still 
being able to maintain its core principle.92 
The Ninth Circuit took the position that even if the amateurism 
definition was consistent, the NCAA cannot justify the challenged 
restraints “simply by pointing out that it has adhered to those rules 
for a long time.”93 The court agreed with the district court’s finding 
that there is a procompetitive effect to the NCAA’s commitment to 
amateurism, but found that the current restraints have “been more 
restrictive than necessary to maintain its tradition.”94 As such, the 
                                                                                                             
91 Brief for the National Collegiate Athletic Association, supra note 18, at 
52. 
92 The Ninth Circuit even acknowledged that the district court “probably 
underestimated the NCAA’s commitment to amateurism.” O’Bannon, 802 F.3d 
at 1073. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 1079. 
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court mandated that the NCAA permit its “members to give 
scholarship up to the full cost of attendance.”95 
In addressing the Ninth Circuit’s rationale, it is worth noting 
that the NCAA’s purpose in pointing to its various definitions of 
amateurism was not just to highlight the consistency of the 
definitions, but also to emphasize amateurism’s essential nature to 
the college athletic product—an argument supported by a variety 
of consumer opinion surveys. Furthermore, although the court’s 
ruling keeps student-athlete compensation within the NCAA’s 
standards of the amateurism definition, there are a host of 
problems with its justification for the ruling. The court 
acknowledged that the challenged restraints serve a procompetitive 
purpose: Promoting amateurism.96 When a restraint is reasonably 
necessary to promote a procompetitive business purpose, it should 
be upheld.97 As the Ninth Circuit itself admits, “it is not . . . [the] 
court’s function to tweak every market restraint that the court 
believes could be improved.”98 In finding that the procompetitive 
effect does not justify the challenged restraints, the court is making 
a judgment call, second-guessing the rationale of the NCAA as to 
the most efficient way of maintaining its tradition of amateurism. 
The court justifies its “tweak” by claiming that the challenged 
restraint is “patently and inexplicably stricter than is necessary to 
accomplish all of its procompetitive objectives.”99 Not only is such 
description a gross overstatement, but it opens the door for further 
litigation. It seems disingenuous to describe a restraint as “patently 
and inexplicably stricter than is necessary,” but find that it need 
                                                                                                             
95 Id. at 1053. 
96 Id. at 1073. 
97 See Am. Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1249–50 
(3d Cir. 1975) (noting its objection to a court “second-guessing business 
judgments as to what arrangements would or would not provide ‘adequate’ 
protection for legitimate commercial interests”); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. 
Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 227–28 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“We do not 
believe . . . the Supreme Court intended that lower courts should calibrate 
degrees of reasonable necessity. That would make the lawfulness of conduct 
turn upon judgments of degrees of efficiency. There is no reason in logic why 
the question of degree should be important.”). 
98 O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1075. 
99 Id. 
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only be changed by a mere eleven percent, the difference between 
cost of attendance and full grant in aid.100 This trivial difference 
not only shows that the ruling is frivolous, but it also sets the tone 
for future plaintiffs to make small additions to this cap, without 
needing to prove that a substantial change is warranted. The court 
acknowledges this point, admitting that there is “little doubt that 
plaintiffs will continue to challenge the arbitrary limit imposed . . . 
until they have captured the full value of their [name, image, and 
likeness].”101 
 
                                                                                                             
100 Average full grant-in-aid for an in-state undergraduate at a Pac-12 
school for the 2015–16 academic year is $31,053. To raise that amount to the 
full cost-of-attendance, the average increase in cost would be $3,542, or 11%. 
This number is as low as 2% at schools such as University of Southern 
California. See Stephanie Loh, Pac-12, MWC cost of attendance estimate, SAN 
DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/ 
news/2015/mar/03/aztecs-football-penn-state-cost-of-attendance-5000/; Tuition 
& Fees, WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY, https://admission.wsu.edu/tuition-
costs/tuition-break-down/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2015); Cost of Attendance, 
UNIVERSITY OF OREGON, https://financialaid.uoregon.edu/cost_of_attendance 
(last visited Dec. 15, 2015); 2015-2016 Estimated Cost of Attendance, THE 
UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA, http://financialaid.arizona.edu/undergraduate/ 
estimated-cost-attendance (last visited Dec. 15, 2015); Cost of Attendance, 
OREGON STATE UNIVERSITY, http://financialaid.oregonstate.edu/ 
review_costofattendance (last visited Dec. 15, 2015); Cost of Attendance, 
BERKELEY UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, http://admissions.berkeley.edu/ 
costofattendance (last visited Dec. 15, 2015); How Much Will My Education 
Cost?, USC UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, http://www.usc.edu/ 
admission/fa/undergraduates/admitted/how-much-will-my-education-cost.html 
(last visited Dec. 15, 2015); Fees, Tuition, and Estimated Student Budget, 
UCLA, https://www.admissions.ucla.edu/prospect/budget.htm (last visited Dec. 
15, 2015); The Student Budget, STANFORD, http://financialaid.stanford.edu/ 
undergrad/budget/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2015); In-State Undergraduate 
Estimated Costs, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO BOULDER, 
https://bursar.colorado.edu/tuition-fees/estimated-cost-of-attendance/in-state-
undergraduate-estimated-costs/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2015); Undergraduate cost 
of attendance, ASU, https://students.asu.edu/financialaid/coa/undergraduate (last 
visited Dec. 15, 2015); Total Cost of Attendance, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, 
https://admit.washington.edu/Paying/Cost (last visited Dec. 15, 2015); Cost, THE 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, http://admissions.utah.edu/cost/ (last visited Dec. 15, 
2015). 
101 O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1079. 
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2. The Challenged Restraints Play a Significant Role In Driving 
Consumer Demand Because They Create a Unique Product 
 
After considering the consumer surveys, the district court 
found that the challenged restraints play only a limited role in 
driving consumer demand.  This is a far too narrow view of the 
effect of the regulations. The challenged restraints drive consumer 
demand by distinguishing college sports from professional sports, 
which “enables a product to be marketed which might otherwise be 
unavailable.”102 The result is wider consumer choice, which is a 
traditional procompetitive benefit in antitrust law. Thus, the 
restraints play an essential role in driving consumer demand 
because they define a unique product. 
 
3. The NCAA Restraints Are Valid as a Matter of Law Under 
Board of Regents 
 
The district court and the Ninth Circuit concluded that, because 
the Board of Regents case only “addressed limits on television 
broadcasting, not payments to student-athletes,” the portions of the 
case that seemingly pertain to this case are simply dicta.103 Similar 
to the district court’s ruling on the role of the restraints in driving 
demand, this view is far too narrow. The Supreme Court’s analysis 
of the rules against compensation of student-athletes was integral 
to the analytical framework the Court adopted. The Court itself 
stated that the challenged restraint in Board of Regents was 
unlawful because it did “not . . . fit into the same mold as do rules 
defining the . . . eligibility of participants.”104 Thus, the eligibility 
of student-athletes was a substantial consideration in the Board of 
Regents analysis, just as it is in the amateurism analysis here.  
                                                                                                             
102 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 
U.S. 85, 102 (1984). 
103 O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 999 
(N.D. Cal. 2014). See also O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1062 (“The Board of Regents 
Court certainly discussed the NCAA’s amateurism rules at great length, but it 
did not do so in order to pass upon the rules’ merits, given that they were not 
before the Court.”). 
104 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 118. 
18
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 11, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol11/iss3/2
2015] THROWING THE FLAG ON PAY-FOR-PLAY 173 
Even if the court determines that the amateurism analysis in Board 
of Regents is dicta, such analysis should be given considerable 
deference and adhered to except in the most extreme 
circumstances—circumstances not present here.105 Indicating as 
much, every challenge to amateurism under the Sherman Act since 
the Board of Regents ruling has failed.106 
Additionally, the district court’s claim that the industry of 
college sports has changed a great deal in the last thirty years is not 
persuasive. The court appears to be concerned that the increased 
commercialization of athletics over the last thirty years has made 
the Board of Regents ruling inapplicable. Although the revenue of 
college sports has exploded in recent years, college sports were 
already highly commercialized when Board of Regents was 
decided.107 The NCAA manages this commercial pressure today as 
it did thirty years ago—by maintaining its commitment to its 
central amateurism and educational principles. In fact, the 
“eligibility rules [which] create the product . . . allow its survival in 
the face of commercialized pressures” by separating the students 
from commercial exposure.108 As such, the precedent remains 
pertinent to this case until the Supreme Court rules otherwise or 
Congress acts contrary to the ruling. 
 
B.  The O’Bannon Court’s Competitive Balance Ruling Will Result 
in a Competitive Advantage for Wealthier Schools 
 
The district court’s ruling that the NCAA’s competitive 
balance argument does not justify the challenged restraints, while 
                                                                                                             
105 See United States v. Augustine, 712 F.3d 1290, 1295 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(“[C]onsidered Supreme Court dictum is special. We do not treat considered 
dicta from the Supreme Court lightly. Rather, we accord it appropriate 
deference.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
106 Brief Amici Curiae of American Council on Education, Association of 
Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges, and National Association of 
Independent Colleges and Universities in Support of Defendant-Appellant and 
Reversal at 13–14, O’Bannon, 802 F.3d 1049 (No. 14–16601), ECF No. 20. 
107 Brief for the National Collegiate Athletic Association, supra note 18, at 
29. 
108 McCormack v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 845 F. 2d 1338, 1345 
(5th Cir. 1988). 
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facially solid, has several anticompetitive cracks.109 The court 
reasoned that money currently spent on training facilities and 
coaching cancels out the procompetitive effects that the challenged 
restraints are claimed to provide. Although it is true that high-
revenue schools are already able to spend money on coaches and 
training facilities to attract student-athletes, these aspects of 
recruiting lack the feature of immediacy. Coaches and facilities are 
semi-permanent fixtures—they are not instantly removable and 
they often cannot be created or hired in a matter of days.110 
Allowing universities greater flexibility to pay student-athletes 
adds an aspect of immediate competitive bidding to the recruiting 
process. 
The ability to bid competitively, while normally a staple of 
antitrust law, in this case would allow the wealthier colleges to 
quickly react to the scholarship offers of other universities. A 
wealthy university, however, is unable to immediately construct a 
new training facility to better recruit an athlete suddenly interested 
in another school. After the O’Bannon ruling, a wealthier school 
will be able to make its initial scholarship offer, knowing that if a 
smaller school makes a recruiting push, it now has more room to 
raise the amount of money offered to the student-athlete. While 
this ability is somewhat mitigated by the cap on the available 
scholarship, the likely rise of the cap over time will allow greater 
flexibility to this potentially anticompetitive bidding process. As 
the Ninth Circuit recognized, there is “little doubt that plaintiffs 
will continue to challenge the arbitrary limit imposed . . . until they 
have captured the full value of their [name, image, and 
likeness].”111 While the existing state of college recruiting may 
already hurt the competitive balance, the competitive balance will 
be damaged even further as universities are given additional 
                                                                                                             
109 As previously noted, the NCAA focused the majority of its appellate 
argument on its amateurism justification. As such, the Ninth Circuit “accept[ed] 
the district court’s factual findings that the compensation rules do not promote 
competitive balance” without consideration of the NCAA’s original arguments 
or those made in its post-trial brief. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1072. 
110 Coaches are typically under contract for extended periods of time, 
making it difficult and costly to fire one without just cause. 
111 O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1079. 
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flexibility in their ability to pay student-athletes. 
 
C.  Upcoming Litigation: Jenkins v. National Collegiate Athletics 
Association112 
 
Jenkins v. National Collegiate Athletics Association is a federal 
class action case that was recently filed in the U.S. District Court 
for the Northern District of California and was assigned to the 
same judge who ruled on the O’Bannon case, Judge Wilken.113 No 
trial date has been set. Plaintiffs Martin Jenkins, Nigel Hayes, and 
Anfornee Steward are student-athletes who currently compete at 
Division I schools.114 They represent a class consisting of players 
in either Division I men’s basketball or football who, at any time 
from the date of the Complaint through the date of the final 
judgment, received or will receive a written offer for a full 
scholarship.115 The defendants consist of the NCAA and the five 
major conferences: The Pacific-12, the South Eastern Conference, 
the Big Ten, the Big 12, and the Atlantic Coast Conference.116 
Plaintiffs allege that the “[d]efendants have entered into what 
amounts to cartel agreements with the avowed purpose and effect 
of placing a ceiling on the compensation that may be paid to these 
athletes for their services.”117 Under current NCAA and power 
conference rules, student-athletes may receive financial assistance 
only up to the full cost of attendance, in exchange for their 
services.118 The plaintiffs claim that the defendants have jointly 
conspired and agreed upon this restriction, and that such an 
agreement is illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.119 
                                                                                                             
112 In June 2015, Jenkins and two other cases were consolidated into a case 
entitled In re: NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation before Judge 
Wilken. 
113 Amended Complaint-Class Action Seeking Injunction at 1, In Re: Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., No. 4:14-md-02541 
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2015), ECF No. 142. 
114 Id. at 3–4. 
115 Id. at 6. 
116 Id. at 1. 
117 Id. 
118 O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1079. 
119 Amended Complaint-Class Action Seeking Injunction, supra note 113, 
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The NCAA and the major conferences are “engaged in the 
business of . . . operating major college football and men’s 
basketball businesses, including the sale of tickets and telecast 
rights.”120 Plaintiffs claim that, absent the challenged restrictions, 
the member-schools of each conference would vigorously compete 
for the services of certain basketball and football players in order 
to best succeed in this business.121 This competition would 
allegedly occur upon the removal of the limitations on the 
remuneration that players may receive for their athletic services.122  
Without a cap, plaintiffs claim that schools would provide 
prospective athletes with recruiting inducements and offer to 
provide substantial benefits during their tenure as student-athletes, 
both of which are subject to significant restrictions by the NCAA 
and conference rules.123 
As support for their argument, plaintiffs note that member-
schools are currently competing against each other for the services 
of student-athletes, but within the constraints of the rules 
prohibiting financial compensation beyond the price-fixed 
limits.124 “[Student-athletes] are so desired that national media 
outlets closely track recruitments from as early as freshman year in 
high school until National Signing Day.”125 Thousands of high 
school students are profiled and many are brought to individual 
campuses for a more personal recruitment experience.126  
Additionally, plaintiffs note that schools are constantly upgrading 
their athletic facilities and arenas to appeal to prospective student-
athletes.127 
Plaintiffs argue the member-schools’ incomes are so great that 
competition would be vigorous and highly beneficial to student-
athletes.128 The sixty-five schools in the five power conferences 
                                                                                                             
at 1. 
120 Id. at 7. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 8. 
123 Id. at 9–10. 
124 Id. at 18. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 19. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 18. 
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reported total revenues of 5.15 billion dollars in 2011–2012.129 A 
significant portion of this revenue came from television rights to 
broadcast football and basketball games.130 The popularity of the 
sports has become so profitable that individual conference 
broadcasting contracts have risen as high as three billion dollars.131 
Overflowing with cash, restricted from competing for student-
athletes, and with economic incentive to field the best team, the 
member-schools have directed their resources to the hiring of 
coaches and the construction of arenas and training facilities.132 
The most relevant difference between the Jenkins suit and the 
O’Bannon case is the scope of the challenged restraints. The 
O’Bannon Complaint focuses on the restraints preventing the 
compensation of student-athletes for the use of their names, 
images, and likenesses. Plaintiffs in Jenkins complain that any 
restraint on compensation to student-athletes or potential student-
athletes has an anticompetitive effect on competition. 
 
D.  The O’Bannon Ruling Will Have Devastating Results if Applied 
to Jenkins 
 
The NCAA is likely to present the same general justifications 
for its stance against compensating student-athletes in Jenkins as it 
did in O’Bannon. As Jenkins will be presided over by the same 
district court judge, it is very likely that those justifications will be 
similarly considered. This section will discuss the effect the 
rationale from O’Bannon would have on the Jenkins suit and any 
additional arguments in favor of the justifications, in light of the 
broad scope of Jenkins. 
 
1. The O’Bannon Court’s Amateurism Ruling Could Make 
College Athletes More Similar To Professionals Than Students 
 
The district court and the Ninth Circuit in O’Bannon 
acknowledged that the NCAA’s restraints do promote amateurism 
                                                                                                             
129 Id. at 19. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 21. 
132 Id. at 19. 
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and have some procompetitive value, but found that they did not 
justify the challenged restraints.133 In doing so, the courts 
questioned the NCAA’s means of maintaining its tradition of 
amateurism. The Ninth Circuit found the NCAA’s restraints to be 
“patently and inexplicably stricter than is necessary,” despite 
finding only an additional eleven percent of the scholarship needed 
to be added. While the Ninth Circuit attempted to make it clear that 
paying student-athletes a lump sum of money would violate the 
procompetitive goal of amateurism,134 the O’Bannon ruling sets 
the tone for future cases to make additions to the scholarship cap. 
Jenkins presents an opportunity for the court to do just that. 
It seems unlikely that the Jenkins court will completely 
eliminate the cap on how much student-athletes can be paid, in the 
face of the NCAA’s amateurism argument. But if the courts were 
to continue to make small increases to the cap and maintain that 
the amateurism aspect remains intact, any semblance of the 
NCAA’s historical idea of amateurism would disappear. If the cap 
were to continue to steadily increase, the amount of money that 
could, and likely would, be offered to student-athletes would make 
them more similar to professional athletes than amateurs and 
students. For example, the fair market value of a Louisville 
basketball player in 2012 was 1.5 million dollars per year.135 The 
only Louisville player to be drafted into the NBA in the first round 
the following year currently makes 1.1 million dollars per year.136 
Comparably, this player would have made more as a college 
athlete than as a professional, if paid to scale. While it is unlikely 
                                                                                                             
133 O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1072–73, 
1079 (9th Cir. 2015). 
134 The Ninth Circuit noted that the “difference between offering student-
athletes education-related compensation and offering them cash sums . . . is a 
quantum leap.” O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1078. 
135 Tony Manfred, Here’s How Much Big-Time College Athletes Should Be 
Getting Paid, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 20, 2013), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/heres-how-much-college-athletes-are-worth-
2013-3. 
136 Associated Press, Shabazz Muhammad, Gorgui Dieng finalize contracts 
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that the cap would be raised that high, the Ninth Circuit 
acknowledged that the plaintiffs are going to continue to fight the 
arbitrary cap “until they have captured the full value of their 
[name, image, and likeness].”137 
 
2. The O’Bannon Court’s Competitive Balance Ruling Could 
Allow Colleges To Bid Any Amount for a Student-Athlete 
 
In rejecting the competitive balance justification, the O’Bannon 
court reasoned that such a balance would not be affected by 
compensating student-athletes because of the immense amount of 
money spent on new training facilities and coaches.138 This 
rationale could have a devastating effect on competition if applied 
to the Jenkins suit and highlights the weaknesses of the O’Bannon 
court’s rationale. Premium athletes are likely to receive offers from 
many wealthy schools. As the college sports industry has grown, 
more schools have built new facilities and paid top-dollar for 
coaches, as pointed out in the O’Bannon decision.139 Building a 
                                                                                                             
137 O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1079. 
138 O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 978–79 
(N.D. Cal. 2014). 
139 For example, since 2008, the majority of the fifteen teams in the Atlantic 
Coast Conference have undergone major football stadium renovations. See 
Robby Kalland, LOOK: Renovations almost complete at Duke’s Wallace Wade 
Stadium, CBS SPORTS (Aug. 20, 2015), 
http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/eye-on-college-football/25276051/ 
look-renovations-almost-complete-at-dukes-wallace-wade-stadium; Kenan 
Stadium, GOHEELS.COM, http://www.goheels.com/ViewArticle.dbml? 
ATCLID=205912861 (last visited Dec. 15, 2015); Sun Life Stadium Renovations 
for 2015, HURRICANESPORTS.COM (Jan. 20, 2015), 
http://www.hurricanesports.com/ViewArticle.dbml?ATCLID=209857165; Lane 
Stadium/Worsham Field, HOKIESPORTS.COM, http://www.hokiesports.com/ 
football/lanestadium.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2015); Bud Elliott, Due to 
stadium renovations, Florida State to hold spring game in Orlando Citrus Bowl, 
TOMAHAWKNATION.COM (Jul. 6, 2015), http://www.tomahawknation.com/ 
2015/7/6/8901239/florida-state-spring-game-orlando-citrus-bowl-stadium-
renovation-fsu-football; Memorial Stadium Suite Renovations, CLEMSON TIGERS 
(Oct. 18, 2013), http://www.clemsontigers.com/ViewArticle.dbml? 
DB_OEM_ID=28500&ATCLID=209288457; BB&T Field, WAKE FOREST 
SPORTS, http://www.wakeforestsports.com/facilities/wake-bbt-field.html (last 
visited Dec. 15, 2015); Carl Smith Center, home of David A. Harrison III Field 
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state-of-the-art training facility may be a significant recruiting tool 
for some athletes, but it will have no competitive advantage for 
those athletes who see such buildings at every school they 
consider. The only way to compete for those student-athletes 
would be to outbid all other schools. 
The O’Bannon court capped the amount a student-athlete can 
be paid, temporarily mitigating this problem, but the Jenkins suit 
aims at eliminating all restrictive caps on paying student-athletes. 
While many schools are likely able to afford to pay student-
athletes the full cost of attendance, the freedom to bid any amount 
could destroy competitive balance. The difference in earnings 
between colleges is so vast that the wealthiest group of schools 
could easily outbid those with lesser profits. For example, the top 
earning school in Division I college basketball for 2014 made 
nearly twenty-five million dollars in profit.140 The twenty-fifth 
most profitable team earned just over seven million dollars.141 That 
is a seventy-two percent drop in profit in twenty-four spots; a 
difference that will grow significantly when considering the 
discrepancy between the top-earning school and the 200th or 300th 
school.142 The ability to bid any amount for the services of a 
student-athlete is unlikely to completely overshadow the millions 
of dollars spent on coaching and facilities. But with so many 
universities building such facilities and hiring notable coaches, 
prospective student-athletes are going to have to look elsewhere to 
differentiate between schools. The ability of the wealthiest schools 
to bid any amount to recruit a student would surely lead to 
competitive imbalance.  
 
 
                                                                                                             
at Scott Stadium, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, http://www.virginiasports.com/ 
facilities/scott-stadium.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2015). 
140 College Basketball’s Most Valuable Teams 2014, FORBES (Mar. 17, 
2014), http://www.forbes.com/pictures/emdm45ehefd/1-louisville-cardinals-6/. 
141 Id. 
142 There are 351 teams in Division I college basketball. NCAA Division I 
Men’s Basketball Team Scoring Per Game Statistics, ESPN.COM, 
http://espn.go.com/mens-college-basketball/statistics/team/_/stat/scoring-per-
game (last visited Dec. 15, 2015). 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of antitrust law is to protect the consumer, which 
is why certain procompetitive factors can outweigh and justify 
anticompetitive restrictions. Both the district court and the Ninth 
Circuit in O’Bannon appear to have ignored such procompetitive 
justifications in light of the alleged injustice suffered by student-
athletes. As such, the courts may have opened the door for the 
eventual elimination of the current college sports product. The 
Jenkins suit presents a dangerous opportunity for the court to do 
just that. If the Jenkins court follows the same rationale that it did 
in O’Bannon, despite the larger scope of Jenkins, college sports 
may begin to closely resemble professional associations. The 
elimination of such a sought-after product would only harm 





 If a favorable Jenkins ruling allows athletes to negotiate 
any payment in exchange for attending a certain college, 
attorneys who work in sports law, as well as sports agents 
(many/most of whom are lawyers), may soon have a new 
field of clientele. 
 A high school student and his parents may need to hire an 
attorney for advice on signing with a college and to review 
the contract the student will have to sign with the college. 
A familiarity with the relevant case law will be essential.  
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